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RECENT CASES

TORTS--PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY IN
TORT-MEASURE OF PROOF: DEFECTIVENESS OF PRODUCTUNREASONABLY DANGEROUS TEST ABANDONED
Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
N Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corporation' a unanimous California
Supreme Court held that an injured person seeking to impose strict
tort liability on the seller or manufacturer of an injury-causing product
need only prove that the product was defective. It is not necessary to
prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous.
Plaintiff William Cronin, a delivery driver employed by a California
bakery, was severely injured when the delivery truck he was driving
collided with another vehicle, left the highway, and crashed into a
roadside ditch. On impact an aluminum hasp, part of a restraining system
for bread racks stored in the rear of the van, fractured, allowing the
racks to roll forward into the driver's compartment where they struck
the plaintiff and propelled him through the windshield.
Plaintiff brought suit against J. B. E. Olson Corp., which had acted
as sales agent and general contractor in supplying the truck.2 Cronin based
his action on a theory of strict liability in tort claiming the aluminum
hasp was so defective as to render the vehicle unsafe for its intended
use,3 and asserting that this defective condition was a direct and
substantial cause of his injuries. At trial plaintiff introduced expert
testimony to establish the defective condition of the hasp which was
characterized as being "extremely porous," "full of holes, voids, and
cracks," and "just a very, very bad piece of metal."' 4 Plaintiff did not,
however, offer proof that the defect rendered the product unreasonably
dangerous. Despite this fact the jury found in Cronin's favor.
On appeal defendant's main contention was that proof that the
defective condition of the product rendered it unreasonably dangerous
is an essential element in strict liability cases, and that the lower court

1Cronin v. J.B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
2
The original action listed two additional defendants. General Motors Corp. manufactured the chassis of the truck involved but was dismissed before trial. Chase
Chevrolet actually sold the vehicles to Cronin's employer but Chase prevailed at the
trial level and was not a party on appeal. 8 Cal.3d at 124, 501 P.2d at 1156, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 436.
3 8 Cal.3d at 124, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
4Id.at 126,501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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erred in failing to so instruct the jury. 5 Without such a requirement, the
defendant argued, strict liability would become absolute liability, attaching
"regardless of the insignificance of the risk posed by the defect or the
fortuity of the resulting harm."16 In support of this contention defendant
cited section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS which reads
in relevant part: "One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused .... " Defendant also cited
"unreasonably dangerous"
California case law wherein the Restatement's
8
language was used and seemingly adopted.
Thus the issue facing the court was whether California's concept of
strict liability necessarily requires a showing that the defective, injurycausing product was also unreasonably dangerous." They held that it does
not. In arriving at this decision the court relied heavily on the language
10
used in its landmark decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.

The plaintiff in Greenman was injured by a piece of wood thrown
from a Shopsmith lathe on which he was working, and it appeared from
the facts that certain safety devices usually present on such machines
were not included on this machine. Greenman based his claim for
recovery on theories of negligence and implied warranty but the ourt
awarded damages on a theory of strict liability in tort. In explaining
that theory Justice Traynor wrote: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."" Speaking to the issue of the plaintiff's burden
of proof under this theory Justice Traynor declared that:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that the
plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in

a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design

5 Id. at 127, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438.

Old. at 128, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 CaL Rptr. at 438.
7 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

SSee Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal.3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1971); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
9 An alternate formulation of the issue would be, "whether the jury must decide that
the injuries were caused by a defective product or by a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous." 8 Cal.3d at 131, 501 P.2d at 461, 104 Cal. Rptr.
at 441.
10 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Greenman]. Greenman is generally recognized as the first case expressly adopting strict
liability in tort.
11 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss2/7

2

Schultz: Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.

Winter, 1974]

RECENT CASES

and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the
2
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.
The court in Cronin pointed out that the purpose of the Greenman
of proof inherent in
rule was to relieve the plaintiff from the problems
3

asserting negligence in product liability cases.'

The court clearly felt

that by injecting an "unreasonably dangerous" element into this
formulation it would be reintroducing some of those problems and
unnecessarily compromising the policy set forth in Greenman. In
particular the court objected to the fact that "unreasonably dangerous,"
like many negligence concepts, is usually defined in terms of the

"ordinary" expectations of the parties. 14

By ruling that the "unreasonably dangerous" element is not essential
the Cronin court has formally readopted the standards of strict liability
In
expressed in Greenman and rejected the Restatement formulation.
among
position
minority
a
in
California
placed
has
so doing the court
in
jurisdictions that have formally adopted the theory of strict liability
ruling
15
court's
the
that
It does not necessarily follow, however,
tort.
change
should be considered surprising, or that it will substantially
theory.
the
under
liabilities
a product supplier's basic
In evaluating the court's action in this case it should be noted that
product
prior to the court's decision in Greenman, a person injured by a
sue for
could
He
recover.
could
had two theories under which he
theories
Both
contract.
in
warranty
of
breach
for
negligence in tort, or sue
6

and
presented real problems for the prospective plaintiff.' As products

it became
their means of distribution became more and more complex
than had
protection
greater
needed
increasingly clear that the consumer
17
and the
liability,
of
concepts
these
under
traditionally been afforded

Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
'3 8 Cal.3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
RESTATEMENT
14 In defining "unreasonably dangerous" comment i to § 402A of the
that which would be
beyond
extent
an
to
dangerous
be
must
sold
article
"The
reads:
the ordinary knowlcontemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
characteristics."
its
to
as
community
the
to
edge common
OF TORTS, § 402A, comment i (1965).
proof of an article's "unreasonably
15 For a limited sampling of decisions holding that
v. Clark Equipment
dangerous" condition is a prerequisite to recovery see Greeno Ariz. App. 520, 460
Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Maas v. Dreher, 10435 P.2d 806 (1967);
P.2d 191 (1969); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467,
Ulmer v. Ford
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966);
Jenkins, The Product
Motor Co., 75 Wash. 537, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); see also
AKRON L. REV.
Liability of Manufacturers; An Understanding and Exploration, 4
135, 168-170 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jenkins].
16 See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1062-1063 (1967).
17 As early as 1944 Justice Traynor had expressed the view that traditional theories of
the consumer
contract and negligence liability were insufficient means of protecting
and called for development of a new theory of product liability. Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
12
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courts responded by stretching these concepts to fit the need. The unfortunate result, however, was the development of a series of fictions that
adulterated these original bodies of law without fully serving their intended
purpose."8 It was against this background that the Greenman court finally
recognized a separate theory of strict liability in tort.
Strict liability under either the Greenman or Restatement formulations facilitates the plaintiff's task in most product liability cases, and
represents a recognition of the consumer's need for the maximum
allowable protection.' 9 While recognizing the same basic need and the
same basic limits on their capacities to fill that need, 20 it would appear
that the courts adopting the Greenman formulation and those adopting
the Restatement view disagree, at least tacitly, on where the emphasis
of their action should be placed. It would also appear that the import
given to the phrase "condition unreasonably dangerous" is the medium
through which this disagreement is expressed.
This phrase seems to have been the source of quiet confusion ever
since its inception. Justice Traynor viewed the "unreasonably dangerous"
language as comprising one of many helpful, though not completely
satisfactory, definitions of defectiveness. It is clear, however, that he
regarded defectiveness as the touchstone of liability and he noted
several other definitions of defectiveness that would be equally useful
in certain fact situations.-"
Professor Wade on the other hand suggests that the "unreasonably
dangerous" or, in his words, the "not reasonably safe" condition of
the injury-causing product is its true liability-producing characteristic. In
his view the word "defective" is superfluous. 22 The courts adopting the
Restatement view seem to have given equal credence to both views.
They require a plaintiff to prove not only that the product was defective
but that it was unreasonably dangerous as well. 23
This confusion can be explained, though not resolved, by exploring
the rather subtle differences in the public policy considerations underlying

18See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Y LE L.J. 1099, 1118 (1960); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products

and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Traynor].
19 Strict liability in tort has been said to be "strict" in the sense that the plaintiff no
longer must bear the difficult burden of proving negligence. And, since the liability is
"in tort" the defendant cannot insulate himself by employing the warranty defenses
of contract. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, 1071 (1967).
20 The author has discovered no jurisdiction that has expressed an intention to hold
a manufacturer or distributor as an insurer for all injuries caused by its products.
21 Traynor, supra note 18.
22

Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) [hereinafter

cited as Wade].
23 Cases cited note 15 supra.
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these conflicting interpretations. The policy arguments that seemingly
underlie the Restatement formulation, as interpreted by most courts, were
recognized, though not endorsed, by Professor Prosser in his famous
Assault Upon the Citadel article. It was argued that strict liability
would "... provide a healthy and highly desirable incentive for producers
' 24
and that, "public interest in human
to make their products safe,"
life, health, and safety demands the maximum possible protection that
the law can give against dangerous defects in products...."2
The main thrust of these statements is toward safety and the
protection of the consumer through the elimination of unsafe products.
When speaking in terms of encouraging safety one is placing primary
emphasis on the supplier and the effect strict product liability will have on
his actions. From this frame of reference the objective test26 of liability
expressed in the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" seems quite
acceptable. It retains the flavor of, and provides continuity with, the
elemental ideas of blame and responsibility underlying earlier negligence
and warranty theories27 while, at the same time, it extends the product
supplier's liability to the maximum extent useful in fostering product safety.
Examining the pronouncements of the public policy considerations
behind the Greenman formulation we find a different emphasis. In
announcing the Greenman rule the court stated: [T]he purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are born [sic] by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
2
protect themselves." s A similar statement of policy appears in Vander"
mark v. Ford Motor Co.29 wherein the California Supreme Court stated:
"Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing
goods to the public. They are an integral part of the overall producing
and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting
30
from defective products." The court went on to state that in its view
such a policy does no injustice since manufacturers and retailers can

24
25

Prosser, supra note 18, at 1119.
Id. at 1122.

The test is termed objective in the sense that a jury determination of the product's
or
safety characteristics is made in relation to their own view as representative
ordinary members of the community rather than in relation to plaintiff's actual
knowledge or conceptions. For the effect of such a distinction see Fanning v. LeMay,
38 Il.2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967).
wherein
27 The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" had its beginnings in warranty law
not
liability under implied warranty was sometimes imposed according to whether or note
the product was "fit and reasonably safe for use by the consumer." Wade, supra
22, at n.54.
28 59 Cal.2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
2961 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
30 Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899,
26
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protect against losses by procuring insurance and including the cost of
such protection in the cost of the product.3 '
The language of these cases indicates that the primary thrust of this
policy is to insure compensation to the innocent victim of a productinduced injury. Given this original emphasis it is not unreasonable to
expect that the court would disfavor an objective test of liability that
is insensitive to the actual expectations of a particular victim.
The Alaska Supreme Court, in a recent decision,3 2 expressly
recognized the disparity in the Greenman and Restatement formulations.
In formally adopting the Greenman view it voiced as its own the
public policy language of the Greenman court and expressed its
preference toward the adoption of the simplest (from the plaintiff's
standpoint) possible burden of proof standards.u3
The reason most often postulated for the Restatement's inclusion of
the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is that it was meant to prevent
the suppliers of products with an innate potential for harm due to abuse,
carelessness, or some strange fortuity (e.g., liquors, drugs, simple tools)
from becoming absolutely liable for all harm they might cause.M The case
of Cornelius v. Bay Motors 5 presents a good example of how section
402A's "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is applied to prevent this
result. In that case the plaintiff had purchased a seven-year-old used car
from a retail dealer and had driven it only a few hours when the brakes
failed causing a collision. The injured buyer brought suit on a theory of
strict liability claiming the brakes were defective and were the direct
cause of his injury. While it was determined that the brakes were indeed
defective they were not found to have rendered the car unreasonably
dangerous and recovery was denied. On appeal the court held that whether
a product is "unreasonably dangerous" is a question of fact to be decided
by the members of the jury based upon their common knowledge and
expectations of product safety. The jury in this case apparently felt
that mechanical defects on a seven-year-old automobile should have
been anticipated and checked for by the buyer.
Significantly, the court in Cronin agrees that product suppliers
should not become absolutely liable. The court asserts, however, that

31 Id. at 263, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900.

32

Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).

33 Id. at 248.

34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment i (1965); Prosser, Strict
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966). See, e.g.,
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Worrell v.

Liability to the Consumer in California, 18
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).

35258 Ore, 564, 484 P,2d 299 (1971).
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was
requiring proof of defect and also requiring proof that the defect
36
the proximate cause of the injury is sufficient to prevent that result.
37
It would seem that the court is correct in that assertion, but it is
that in
like
situation
unclear how the Cronin court would handle a fact
that
made
be
could
finding
a
Presumably
supra.
Motors
v.
Bay
Cornelius
the buyer's failure to inspect the brakes rather than the actual brake
failure was the proximate cause of the injury. In the alternative the court
might find that the automobile was simply worn out and not defective.
This however, points up a major weakness shared by both the Cronin and
Greenman decisions. That weakness is the failure to give concrete
guidance as to when an article should be adjudged defective. Are products
to be judged in relation to the average quality of like products as was
the Shopsmith in Greenman; or by reference to how well it performs
38
its intended function as implied in Cronin; or in relation to the safety
9
expectations of the particular consumer? Clearly no one standard will
suffice in all situations; applicability will vary according to40 the type of
injury sustained and the type of product causing the injury.
Until the term "defective" takes on a more definite and predictable
meaning the long range effects of Cronin on a product supplier's liability
will remain unclear. Some observations as to the present status of
California strict liability law can be made, however. Clearly a California
plaintiff no longer has to allege and prove a product's "unreasonably
dangerous" condition in order to recover. Even so, the product supplier is
not an insurer of his products, nor is it indicated that he will become
one. His basic liability has not been increased, but his exposure to possibly
successful claims has been widened to the extent that he relied on the
stiffer burdens of proof and the objective characteristics of the "unreason-

36 8 Cal.3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr.at 442.
37 The courts who still hold that strict liability can be imposed only on warranty
principles "sounding in tort" have not been considered leaders in the move toward
increasing the product supplier's liability, but the standard statement of implied
warranty (a product must be reasonably fit for the purposes for which it was
intended) indicates that liability would attach without a showing of a "condition
unreasonably dangerous." Jenkins, supra note 15, at 161. See Lonzrick v. Republic

Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St.2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-314(2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f).
38 The New Jersey Supreme Court has given official sanction to this definition of
"defective" but does not consider it to be exclusive of others. Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
39 Though there have been no cases decided using this definition it would appear to
be acceptable under the Cronin standards.
40 For a full discussion see Freedman, "Deject" in the Product; The Necessary Basis
for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33 TENN. L.R. 323 (1966); Traynor,
supra note 18.
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ably dangerous requirement" to thin the ranks of prospective claimants. 41
Finally, when and if other jurisdictions consider adoption of the Cronin
stance it should be done with the demands of public policy well in
mind. Defectiveness as a touchstone of liability can become a meaningless
fiction if it is interpreted simply as an injury-causing characteristic
of a product. 42 The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is a useful
safeguard against that possibility, and should not be lightly discarded.
STANLEY M. SCHULTZ

41 This type of exposure has been further widened by the court's decision in Lugue

v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972), wherein the
court held that a plaintiff no longer has to allege that he was "unaware" of a defect,
although a showing by the defendant of plaintiff's knowledge will bar recovery.
42
Traynor, supra note 18, at 372.
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